New Zealand releases testing and monitoring requirements, names approved test labs for online casino licensees ahead of this week’s auction
With the auction for online casino licenses getting underway this week, New Zealand’s Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) has released a discussion draft of its Testing and Monitoring Requirements for Online Casino Gambling Technology, outlining its proposed testing, certification and monitoring regime for operators under the nation’s Online Casino Gambling Act 2026.
The draft, which lists three approved independent test labs – GLI Australia, Quality Assurance Laboratories and BMM Australia – comprises a series of key requirements for prospective licensees.
Specifically, it reveals that all applicants must before obtaining a license provide a Game and RNG Register showing that every intended game, including live dealer games, as well as every RNG (Random Number Generator), has been tested by one of the approved test labs. Applicants must also disclose critical technology providers and their data center or cloud-hosting locations, with evidence of ISO 27001 or equivalent assurance.
At license commencement, operators must provide an updated Game and RNG Register plus confirmation from their CEO or Chief Compliance Officer that all of its technology – including third-party technology, infrastructure, operating systems, databases and gaming software – is compliant.
The draft specifically points to periodic vulnerability scans and penetration testing of each operator’s platform for security reasons, as well as ongoing system and Return to Player monitoring and a requirement for operators to maintain all documentation in relation to testing conducted.
In regard to ongoing testing, every new game or RNG introduced at any time must be tested externally and existing games or RNGs retested where a change affects or may affect fairness Minor changes that don’t affect fairness can generally be handled through internal testing albeit only if they have robust development, testing and release controls such as source-code security, version control, access controls, segregation of duties, peer review, and separate development, testing and production environments.
Previous testing of existing games, RNGs, live dealer operations or underlying platform systems for other regulated jurisdictions may be sufficient provided the testing provides sufficient assurance against New Zealand requirements, the draft states, with specific mention of testing and certification undertaken in the United Kingdom and Ontario, Canada.
Operators will, however, require an independent Game Testing and Platform Certification within six months of license approval and at least once annually thereafter.
As reported by Complete iGaming, New Zealand recently launched the Expression of Interest (EOI) stage of its application process for one of 15 online casino licenses it will issue later this year.
The next and perhaps most crucial stage of the process, a two-week “silent auction” by operators for those licenses, is scheduled to take place from this Tuesday 29 September.
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The Backstory
New Zealand moves from policy design to technical gatekeeping
New Zealand’s online casino regime is entering the point where policy gives way to implementation. After more than a year of debate over how open the market should be, the Department of Internal Affairs is now setting the technical conditions operators must meet before they can take bets under the Online Casino Gambling Act 2026. The release of testing and monitoring requirements before the license auction signals that the government wants applicants to compete not only on price but on their ability to prove game fairness, platform security and ongoing regulatory control.
The framework is intended to bring a market long served by offshore operators into a domestic licensing system. The law came into force May 1 and created a limited-license model built around 15 permits, each tied to a platform or brand. Operators may hold as many as three licenses, creating room for large multibrand groups while capping market concentration. The government has said the system is meant to reduce illegal offshore gambling, give regulators direct leverage over providers and establish consumer safeguards that cannot be imposed on companies operating beyond New Zealand’s reach.
Auction model reflects a political compromise
The decision to offer 15 licenses through a competitive auction followed a dispute over whether New Zealand should prioritize incumbent domestic gambling companies or open the market to international operators. SkyCity Entertainment Group, which operates land-based casinos in New Zealand and Australia, pressed the government to issue no more than five online casino licenses and argued that permits should be limited to New Zealand companies. The TAB made a similar case for a smaller market, warning that a broad opening could weaken domestic gambling businesses and shift profits offshore.
Internal Affairs Minister Brooke van Velden rejected that approach, saying the objective was not to protect existing operators but to create a regulated and competitive market. She also raised the risk that favoring local companies could conflict with New Zealand’s trade commitments. That stance, detailed in SkyCity’s push for a five-license cap, set the direction for the current auction process: limited enough to avoid an uncontrolled market, but broad enough to attract overseas gambling groups with established online casino operations.
The result is a licensing contest with strategic implications beyond New Zealand’s relatively small population. A regulated online casino market gives global operators a rare opportunity to enter a high-income jurisdiction with clear rules, an English-language customer base and a government actively trying to redirect play from offshore sites to licensed platforms. The cap on licenses also gives successful bidders scarcity value, particularly if they can secure more than one brand authorization.
Australian and global operators circle the market
The interest list shows why the auction has become consequential. Stake, Virtual Gaming Worlds and Dabble are among Australian-linked operators understood to have examined or pursued New Zealand licenses. Entain, which already controls New Zealand’s online racing and sports betting through TAB, has also indicated interest. SkyCity is expected to bid as well, despite its opposition to the number of licenses on offer.
The mix of possible bidders, described in Australian operators eyeing New Zealand online casino licenses, reflects the broader shift toward regulated market entry among online gambling groups. Stake has expanded in countries including Italy, Brazil, Colombia and Peru. Dabble secured online casino authorization in the United Kingdom. VGW, known for social casino-style products, has faced scrutiny in multiple markets and would view a conventional license as a different route to legitimacy.
For Entain, New Zealand presents a defensive and expansion opportunity. The company already has a privileged position through its TAB partnership, but online casino licensing could allow rivals to enter a digital gambling market where Entain currently has sports and racing scale. The company has moved to sharpen its local structure, appointing Chris Haigh to lead its New Zealand business in a newly created managing director role. That leadership change, covered in Entain’s New Zealand revamp before the market launch, underlines how seriously major operators are treating the shift.
Testing rules turn market access into a compliance test
The draft testing regime places compliance infrastructure at the center of license readiness. Operators must show that every game, live dealer product and random number generator has been assessed by an approved independent laboratory. They must identify critical technology providers and hosting locations, and supply evidence of information security assurance such as ISO 27001 or equivalent controls. At launch, senior executives must attest that the full technology stack, including third-party systems and infrastructure, complies with New Zealand requirements.
Those obligations matter because online casino regulation depends on evidence that regulators can inspect and enforce. Game fairness, payout performance, system integrity and cybersecurity cannot be managed through licensing promises alone. The requirements for vulnerability scans, penetration testing, game registers and annual independent certification give the department a recurring view into the systems handling wagers, customer data and payouts.
The government also appears to be borrowing from established online gambling jurisdictions. The draft says prior testing in markets such as the United Kingdom and Ontario may be accepted if it provides sufficient assurance against New Zealand standards. That approach could reduce duplication for established operators while still forcing them to map overseas certifications to local rules. It also gives an advantage to companies already operating in mature regulatory environments, because their suppliers, platforms and game portfolios are more likely to have existing test reports and compliance documentation.
Test labs gain leverage as regulation expands
The naming of approved test labs comes as the testing, inspection, certification and compliance sector is consolidating to meet demand from newly regulated markets. BMM Australia is one of the laboratories approved for New Zealand’s regime. Its parent company, Visualize Group, recently expanded its footprint by acquiring online casino testing specialist eCOGRA, a move positioned as a response to rising global demand for digital gambling certification.
That transaction, described in Visualize’s acquisition of eCOGRA, points to a structural change in the industry. As more countries legalize or formalize online gambling, independent laboratories become gatekeepers for market entry. Operators need test certificates to launch games, modify platforms and satisfy annual audits. Regulators need labs with enough capacity and credibility to support licensing without slowing the market to a standstill.
For New Zealand, lab capacity will be tested quickly. A silent auction can identify preferred bidders, but those bidders still must produce game registers, platform certifications and security evidence before full commencement. Operators with large game catalogs may need to prioritize titles, remove products that lack adequate documentation or push suppliers to complete testing under New Zealand standards. The technical rules therefore could shape the first wave of live offerings as much as the commercial auction does.
The channelization stakes are visible overseas
New Zealand’s approach fits a broader policy trend: governments are trying to move online gambling from offshore gray markets into licensed systems without making the legal market so restrictive that players remain outside it. The balance is delicate. Too few licenses can limit competition and product appeal. Too many can strain oversight. Excessive advertising or weak controls can increase political pressure, while rules that make licensed operators invisible can leave offshore sites with an advantage.
That tension is evident in other jurisdictions debating gambling regulation. In the Philippines, for example, policymakers are weighing a total gambling advertising ban amid warnings that such a move could push players back to illegal sites. An analysis of the proposal argued that markets such as Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands show how restrictions on licensed operators can weaken channelization if illegal competitors continue reaching customers online. The comparison in the Philippines advertising-ban debate is not directly about New Zealand, but it illustrates the same regulatory trade-off.
New Zealand is trying to avoid that outcome by creating a legal market that is controlled but viable. The auction will decide who gets scarce access. The testing rules will decide who can actually operate. Together, they mark the transition from legislative design to market formation, with the government’s central wager now clear: offshore gambling can be displaced only if licensed operators are commercially credible and technically accountable from the start.









