Canada’s financial watchdog fines two government gaming corporations over AML breaches
The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) has imposed penalties on two government gaming corporations amounting to a total of CA$631,538.50 (US$457,913)1 CAD = 0.7251 USD
2026-09-04Powered by CMG CurrenShift for breaching anti-money laundering (AML) rules.
The fines are reportedly linked to the Atlantic Lottery Corporation’s online gaming operations.
FINTRAC imposed a CA$399,712 (US$289,822)1 CAD = 0.7251 USD
2026-09-04Powered by CMG CurrenShift administrative monetary penalty on New Brunswick Lotteries and Gaming Corporation on 24 July after an investigation found it had failed to file suspicious transaction reports despite reasonable grounds to believe transactions could be linked to AML.
The Nova Scotia Gaming Corporation was also fined CA$231,826 (US$168,091)1 CAD = 0.7251 USD
2026-09-04Powered by CMG CurrenShift on 23 July regarding a separate compliance examination.
FINTRAC found that it had not reported attempted transactions that raised similar AML concerns, failed to maintain its AML compliance procedures, and did not properly assess and document its exposure to money laundering.
Both corporations have paid their penalties in full and FINTRAC has closed the cases.
Under section 207 of the Criminal Code of Canada, provincial governments are permitted to conduct and manage computer-based lottery schemes like online gambling and offer them to their own residents in accordance with provincial laws.
Nova Scotia jointly owns the Atlantic Lottery with the governments of the four Atlantic provinces, including New Brunswick.
In May of this year, the Atlantic Lottery was fined CA$212,025 (US$153,734)1 CAD = 0.7251 USD
2026-09-04Powered by CMG CurrenShift by FINTRAC for similar AML compliance failures.
The fines come during a period of increased regulatory scrutiny of Canada’s gambling market, which recently faced criticism over the rollout of single-event sports betting.
Dig Deeper
The Backstory
Provincial lotteries face a compliance test
FINTRAC’s penalties against New Brunswick Lotteries and Gaming Corp. and Nova Scotia Gaming Corp. land at a sensitive point for Canada’s provincially run gambling model. The fines, totaling CA$631,538.50, center on anti-money laundering failures tied to government gaming corporations rather than private operators, underscoring that public ownership does not lessen compliance expectations.
The cases also put renewed attention on Atlantic Lottery Corp., the regional lottery business jointly owned by New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador. Atlantic Lottery runs the legal online gambling platform for the region and distributes profits back to provincial governments. That structure gives the corporation both a commercial mandate and a public-policy role: it must compete for players, return money to taxpayers and meet federal financial-crime reporting obligations.
Canadian law gives provincial governments broad authority to conduct and manage lottery schemes, including online gambling, under section 207 of the Criminal Code. The framework has allowed provinces to build government-controlled digital betting and lottery platforms while private online operators remain restricted or excluded in many jurisdictions. But the same structure also concentrates responsibility. When suspicious transaction reports are missed or risk assessments are not properly maintained, the failure reflects not only on an operator but on the public system built around it.
A legal monopoly under market pressure
The AML enforcement comes months after Atlantic Lottery’s new president and chief executive, Dallas McCready, framed the corporation’s strategic challenge as both regulatory and competitive. In an interview with COMPLETE iGAMING, McCready said the corporation was not afraid of competition but remained concerned about gray-market operators that advertise to Atlantic Canadians even though they are not legally available in the region.
McCready said Atlantic Lottery estimates about CA$200 million leaves the region each year through play on illegal gambling sites. That outflow matters because Atlantic Lottery’s profits are returned to the four provincial governments. In its 2023-24 annual report, the corporation delivered CA$487 million to the provinces, with Nova Scotia receiving CA$161.7 million and New Brunswick CA$151.2 million. Newfoundland and Labrador received CA$147.3 million and Prince Edward Island CA$26.8 million.
Those public returns help explain why provincial lottery corporations defend their exclusive position in markets such as Atlantic Canada. They argue that legal platforms offer safer play, local oversight and public benefit, while offshore sites operate without Canadian anti-money laundering reporting obligations or provincial responsible-gambling rules. FINTRAC’s latest findings complicate that argument. The enforcement does not validate gray-market operators, but it shows that public-sector gambling businesses must prove the controls they cite as a key distinction are working in practice.
The timing is also awkward because Atlantic Lottery has been pushing growth in digital gaming. The corporation reported 17% growth in gross gaming revenue from its iLottery line in the 2023-24 fiscal year. Growth in account-based play gives operators more data and more tools to detect risky activity, but it also raises the volume and complexity of transactions that compliance teams must monitor.
Sports betting expansion raises the stakes
Atlantic Lottery’s operational burden is set to grow as it modernizes sports betting. Kambi Group announced this year that it had won a multi-province Canada contract to provide sportsbook technology for Atlantic Lottery and British Columbia Lottery Corp. The deal covers Atlantic Canada for Atlantic Lottery and Saskatchewan and Manitoba for BCLC, creating a shared technology and trading foundation across multiple provincial operators.
In announcing the agreement, Atlantic Lottery’s sports betting leadership emphasized trust, integrity and player protection. The Kambi contract with Canadian provincial lotteries reflects a broader shift toward more sophisticated digital betting products, including more automated pricing, broader in-play markets and higher-frequency wagering. Those features can strengthen a legal offering against offshore competitors, but they also increase the importance of real-time monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting.
Sports betting has already drawn political and regulatory attention in Canada since single-event wagering was legalized. Critics have focused on advertising volume, consumer risk and the visibility of betting brands during sports broadcasts. In provinces outside Ontario’s competitive iGaming market, lottery corporations have tried to position themselves as regulated alternatives to offshore betting sites. FINTRAC’s enforcement suggests federal watchdogs are examining whether those same corporations have kept pace on financial-crime controls as online products become more competitive.
The contrast with Ontario remains central. Ontario opened a regulated private iGaming market in 2022 and quickly became one of North America’s largest online gambling jurisdictions. Alberta is expected to move toward a similar model. Atlantic Canada has not taken that route, leaving Atlantic Lottery as the sole legal digital option. That exclusivity gives the corporation a captive legal market but also limits any ability to deflect compliance failures onto a fragmented private sector.
Financial-crime scrutiny is widening globally
The Canadian penalties fit a wider pattern of gambling regulators and financial intelligence units tightening expectations for online betting and casino operators. In Australia, AUSTRAC recently said Sportsbet had completed remediation tied to serious AML and counterterrorism-financing control deficiencies. The watchdog had previously required the Flutter-owned betting group to appoint an external auditor and address weaknesses in risk assessment, customer monitoring and suspicious matter reporting.
The Sportsbet remediation case in Australia shows how regulators are using enforceable undertakings, independent audits and operational reviews to push gambling companies beyond written policies. AUSTRAC’s message was that online gambling faces heightened threats from identity misuse, payment fraud and money laundering, making ongoing control upgrades necessary even for large, sophisticated operators.
In the Philippines, the gambling regulator has taken a sectorwide approach. PAGCOR directed casino and electronic gaming operators to review risk models and update AML and counterterrorism-financing frameworks after a multiyear risk assessment found the sector high risk for money laundering and medium risk for terrorism financing. The regulator specifically pointed to risks tied to high-value transactions, cash activity, junket relationships, electronic gaming and remote channels.
That Philippine AML framework review illustrates the direction of travel: regulators increasingly expect operators, platform suppliers and service providers to demonstrate that customer due diligence, source-of-funds checks, transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting are embedded in daily operations. For lotteries moving more business online, the standard is no longer simply whether a public entity is authorized to operate. It is whether the entity can identify and report financial-crime risks at digital scale.
Channelization arguments depend on trust
Lottery corporations often argue that the best way to reduce harm from offshore gambling is to keep players inside licensed channels. That argument has gained force in markets where regulators say legal operators can verify identity, monitor wagers, enforce exclusion lists and pay taxes. It also has limits. The licensed sector must maintain credibility with both players and watchdogs for channelization to remain persuasive.
The policy debate in the Philippines shows the same tension in a sharper form. A recent analysis warned that a total advertising ban could drive players back to illegal operators by preventing licensed platforms from explaining who is regulated and who is not. The article on gambling advertising bans and illegal market growth argued that enforcement tools work best when players can distinguish licensed sites from offshore operators beyond the state’s reach.
Canada’s provincial lotteries make a comparable case when confronting gray-market sites. Atlantic Lottery and other members of the Canadian Lottery Coalition have sought to raise awareness and curtail illegal operations, including through legal action against Bodog in Manitoba. McCready has said such websites operate without provincial oversight, Canadian AML reporting duties or the consumer protections attached to regulated play.
FINTRAC’s fines do not erase that distinction, but they narrow the margin for error. If government-backed operators are to argue that legal play is safer and more accountable, compliance failures become strategic risks as well as regulatory ones. They can weaken public confidence, invite political scrutiny and give critics of lottery monopolies an opening to question whether public operators should retain exclusive control of online gambling.
The immediate financial hit from the penalties is modest relative to Atlantic Lottery’s annual transfers to provinces. The larger consequence is reputational. As online gambling expands, regulators are signaling that public ownership, regional mandates and social-purpose language will not shield operators from federal AML enforcement. For Atlantic Canada’s lottery model, the next test is whether compliance systems can match the pace of digital growth.











